The North African Landings 1942 - A Strategic Decision ( The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War Series) by Sainsbury, Keith

University of Delaware Press, Newark, DE, 1979. US first edition, hard bound in dust jacket, 5 1/2 x 8 1/2, VG/VG condition ( dj price clipped & small spot of color missing from dj cover), 215 pages, maps, notes, bibliog., index.---------------------------------------------------------------The decision to invade North Africa, rather than to strike directly across the Channel in 1942, was the crucial strategic decision of the first year of the war-time Anglo-American alliance. It determined the course of Allied strategy against Germany for the ensuing two years, and effectively ensured that the British and US military effort in Europe was concentrated in the Mediterranean during that period. In consequence, the opening of the 'Second Front' in North-West Europe, so much desired by the sorely pressed Soviet Union, was postponed until 1944.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Keith Sainsbury has examined the long drawn-out arguments that raged between London and Washington, and especially those between Churchill and General Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff. He has analysed the motives of both men, and in particular the question of the political motives wrongly attributed to Churchill, in his preference for Mediterranean operations, by some American historians. He considers the part played by the British military leaders, General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, the British military representative in Washington, and Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten, the Chief of Combined Operations. He describes the effect of the pressure brought by Admiral Ernest King, the US Navy Chief, and General----------------------------------------------------------Douglas MacArthur for a 'Pacific First' strategy, and the Russian demands for an immediate invasion of North-West Europe. The author tells also of the difficulties encountered by both the British and the Americans in their dealings with the Vichy leaders in North Africa, particularly Admiral Darien and General Giraud, and the complications imposed by the conflicting Anglo-American policies towards General de Gaulle's Free French movement; of how Roosevelt and Churchill finally resolved the Anglo-American dispute in favour of the North African invasion; and concludes with an account of the campaign in Tunisia and of its political and military consequences. This is a major study which will be required reading for all students of present-day international relations.